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THE EXPERIMENT AL USE EXCEPTION TO PA TENT 
INFRINGEMENT: DO UNIVERSITIES 
DESERVE SPECIAL TREATMENT? 
Elizabeth A. Rowe• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Inventor Ivan owns a patent on a new Gizmo. He has spent a substantial portion 
of his time and resources to develop the Gizmo. He has also spent thousands of dollars 
on his patent attorneys to obtain the patent. Ivan had to wait over two years for the 
patent application to be processed and approved. But it was all worth it. Our patent 
laws grant Ivan a negative right-the right to exclude others from practicing his 
invention during the period of the patent. 1 
The local university is using Ivan's invention to further its own research. The 
university's research will allow the university to train many graduate students and 
could potentially result in large profits for the university. The university did not seek 
Ivan's permission to use the Gizmo. Should the university be liable to Ivan for patent 
infringement? Whether Ivan can prevail depends on whether the university can claim 
its unauthorized use of the Gizmo is permitted under the experimental use exception. 
The experimental use exception 2 is a common law exception to the patent-holder's 
exclusive right ofuse. 3 It permits the use ofanother's patented device when such use 
is for philosophical inquiry, curiosity, or amusement. 4 Judging from the scholarship on 
this topic to date, most commentators would probably answer the question posed by 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law. This Article originally 
appeared in the Hastings Law Journal. Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent 
Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special Treatment? 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (2006). It is republished 
here with permission of that journal as a contribution to the Maine Law Review's Closing in on Open 
Science Symposium. The author is very grateful to Jonathan Cohen, Xuan-Thao Nguyen, William Page, 
and Sharon Rush for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. She would also like to thank Jennifer 
Coleman, Jocelyn Crocci, and Luke Napodano for their research assistance. 
I. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000) (granting patent rights for twenty years from the filing date of the 
patent application); see also id. § 271 (2000). "[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or 
sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented 
invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent." Id. § 27l(a). 
2. There is another experimental use defense in patent law, also known as the public use defense, that 
forbids an inventor from obtaining a patent on an invention if the invention was in public use or on sale 
(rather than being used for experimental purposes by the inventor) for more than a year prior to the date of 
the patent application. Id. § I 02(b ). It covers experimentation conducted by the inventor himself on the 
invention. This Article does not address that defense. Rather, it examines the common law experimental 
use exception where the courts determine other people's alleged experimental use of the patentee's 
invention. 
3. Experimental use is considered both an exception and a defense to patent infringement. See Janice 
M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement 
for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. I, 19-21 (2001). 
4. See, e.g., Embrex Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also infra 
Part II. 
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the hypothetical in the negative: the university should not be liable to Ivan for patent 
infringement. This Article, however, rejects such an answer and asserts that the 
university should be liable. 
A. The Outcry from Madey 
The experimental use exception has recently come under attack by many who 
consider it too narrow. 5 They fear that the courts' "narrowing" of the experimental use 
exception will stifle research and innovation. 6 Much of the discontent with the doctrine 
has been spurred by a relatively recent Federal Circuit opinion, Madey v. Duke 
University, which makes clear that a research university does not receive immunity 
under the experimental use exception when its researchers engage in research or 
conduct experiments using patented inventions. 7 This ruling has created an outcry 
because over the years universities appear to have assumed, albeit incorrectly, that their 
research was protected under the doctrine and thus that their scientists need not seek 
permission from patent owners before using patented devices. 8 
Virtually all commentators since Madey have criticized the ruling and its effect on 
the experimental use exception. 9 For instance, one commentator calls it "a seemingly 
disingenuous opinion that neither conforms to the implications of precedent nor 
explains the reasons for steering the law in a different direction, but pretends that prior 
courts never meant to give research science special treatment." 10 Similarly, another 
commentator asserts that the Madey court "stretched the concept of commercial use" 
and that the current experimental use exception "bears little relation to the implications 
ofa particular experimental use for the public benefits of follow-on innovation." 11 
B. A Narrow Experimental Use Exception Makes Sense 
This Article enters the discussion to offer a different and opposing viewpoint. It 
takes the position that a narrow experimental use exception is consistent with existing 
law, consistent with sound public policy, and appropriate for the current nature of 
university research. Contrary to the picture painted by critics of a rapid "narrowing" 
of the exception by the courts, in reality, the experimental use exception has always 
been very narrow. To the extent that universities or others have taken liberties with a 
broader interpretation of the doctrine, the holding inMadey serves simply as a wake-up 
call clarifying the status of the law. Having moved from a philosophical 
5. See, e.g., Andrew J. Caruso, Comment, The Experimental Use Exception: An Experimentalist's 
View, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 215,220 (2003); Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of a Compromised Solution 
to the Problem Arising From Patenting Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANT A CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 347, 365-66 (2004); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does The Public Get?: Experimental Use 
and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81 (2004); Kevin Sandstrom, Note, How Much Do We Value 
Research and Development?: Broadening the Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement in Light 
o/lntegra Lifesciences Ltd. v. Merck, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. I 059, I 067 (2004). 
6. See, e.g., id. 
7. Matley v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see infra Part 11.B.2. 
8. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299 SCIENCE 1018, 1019 (2003). 
9. See supra note 5. 
10. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1019. 
11. Strandburg, supra note 5, at 138-46. 
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experimentation model closer to a business for-profit model in research, it is important 
to consider the fairness of treating universities' patent infringement differently from 
that of their industry counterparts. 
C. The New Face of University Research 
The proper role for the experimental use exception at research universities is a 
complex issue with no easy answer. The main reason for the complexity lies in the 
changed nature of university research during the last two decades. University research 
used to be more akin to research for the sake of research, with university researchers 
engaged in their academic pursuits, anxious to publish their discoveries. Today the 
landscape has changed. University research has become more ofa business, and indeed 
is sometimes difficult to distinguish from industrial research. Patenting, commercial 
development, high tech incubators, and partnerships with industry have become 
commonplace activities for universities. 
The legal problem posed by the experimental use exception cannot be divorced 
from this context. To the extent Madey is viewed as posing a problem for university 
research, any consideration ofa solution must be mindful of this shift in the nature of 
university research. It is not the old image of university research that should govern, 
but today's reality. Admittedly, this poses some tensions because it may be challenging 
to reconcile the purely academic norms and interests of university research with the 
profit-oriented, businesslike activity it is today. The former may deserve a broader 
experimental use exception, and perhaps that is why most critics of the doctrine, 
impliedly viewing university research from the "old" lens, disagree with Madey. 
However, this Article posits that the better approach entails reviewing the situation 
through the newer lens in determining the appropriate rule for patent infringement in 
university research. 
A noteworthy irony underlies this issue: universities probably have much more to 
gain from the strict and narrow interpretation of the patent laws espoused in this Article 
than from the alternative (yet more vocal) viewpoint. That is because universities as 
a group are large patent-holders in this country. 12 They gain billions of dollars in 
revenues annually from patent licenses and royalties. 13 Any interpretation of the 
experimental use exception, or the patent laws generally, that would in effect permit 
greater erosion of patent-holders' rights would impose greater financial detriment to 
universities than the narrow interpretation under Madey. 
D. The Tradeojf Between Patent Protection and Incentives to Innovate 
The overarching theoretical question here concerns the tradeoff between 
protecting patentees' rights and maintaining incentives to innovate. It is of course 
difficult to determine the optimal level of patent protection for increasing invention and 
innovation. In the context of the experimental use exception, this Article posits that a 
narrow experimental use exception will have a more positive effect on incentives to 
innovate than will a broader exception. A narrow experimental use exception, the 
12. See infra text accompanying note 115. 
13. See infra Part IV.B. 
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status quo, strengthens incentives to invent and innovate, while a broad experimental 
use exception would provide disincentives to invest in patenting and innovation. This 
is especially so given the nature of modem university research and existing patent 
licensing practices. 
E. The Reality of the Marketplace 
Contrary to virtually all those who have written about the experimental use 
exception since Madey, I do not see the Madey opinion as the death knell of all 
research and innovation. A closer look at the practical reality reveals that several 
considerations inherent in the business of university research are likely to have a more 
powerful effect on the enforcement of the experimental use exception among 
researchers than the Madey decision. These considerations provide a kind of self-
regulation that will continue to foster research and innovation. 
Moreover, this Article examines two other considerations, not previously 
considered in combination by other commentators, which in effect already expand the 
experimental use exception, affording greater protection to universities where 
applicable. First, a recent United States Supreme Court opinion, Merck KGaA v. 
lntegra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 14 broadly interpreted a federal statute, permitting 
experimentation on patented drugs prior to expiration of their patents. 15 Thus, 
university research involving development of new drugs benefits from this ruling. 
Second, state universities enjoy sovereign immunity from patent infringement suits for 
damages, giving them far greater protection than any experimental use exception could 
provide. 16 
These gaps weigh in favor of saving and safeguarding the doctrine, rather than 
leaving it as an empty shell. The experimental use exception is still of consequence to 
private universities, individual researchers at state universities, industrial researchers, 
and the world of non-drug development researchers. Because each chip off the doctrine 
signals a further erosion of patent-holders' rights and an accompanying harm to the 
incentives to invent and innovate, careful consideration of the doctrine is still required. 
In order to make the exclusive rights granted to a patent owner truly meaningful, 
not only must the infringement laws be strictly observed, but exceptions must remain 
narrow as well. To do otherwise would threaten to erode those rights. Not only is 
broadening the exception a step on a slippery slope, but any such broadening can also 
be very difficult to identify and manage, and can threaten to swallow the exception. 
In some circumstances, however, strict adherence to the experimental use 
exception may stifle experimentation. As a result, any broadening of the exception 
should be defined by Congress in specific situations where a sufficiently compelling 
case has been made that the exclusivity granted to a patent owner will have an injurious 
effect on the public good and on innovation. Thus, under these circumstances, society's 
interests should trump the inventor's patent rights. 
Part II of this Article provides background on the experimental use exception. Part 
III discusses the Bayh-Dole Act, its alteration of the landscape of university research, 
14. 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
15. Id. at 208; see infra Part II.C.2. 
16. See infra Part IV.C.4. 
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and its impact on university patenting activity. Part IV explains why, in reality, 
university research will survive a narrow experimental use exception. Finally, Part V 
discusses why the experimental use exception is appropriately narrow and proposes a 
test that ought to guide Congress in deciding when legislative broadening is necessary. 
IL BACKGROUND ON THE EXCEPTION 
The experimental use exception is a judicially created doctrine that limits a patent-
holder's exclusive rights. 17 The highlights of its evolution and its current status in the 
case law (and legislatively) are described below. 18 It is important to realize that the 
exception was intended to be narrow from the beginning. In Whittemore v. Cutter, 19 the 
first case to apply the exception, Justice Joseph Story, ruling for the defendant, 
declared in dicta that the patent laws did not intend to punish a person who infringes 
a patent "merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the 
sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects." 20 Accordingly, given the 
broad prohibition against any use of a patented invention without permission, the task 
entailed carving out a sliver of use that would not invade the patent-holder's exclusive 
rights. For Justice Story, this sliver included use for purely philosophical inquiry and 
use for determining whether the patented device works as it proclaims. 
Further testimony to the exception's narrowness is the rare success of the 
defense. 21 It appears that over time, the focus of the inquiry shifted from whether the 
alleged infringing use was for profit or financial gain to whether it furthered one's 
legitimate business interests (regardless of profit). However, the courts never wavered 
from their extremely narrow interpretation of the doctrine. When that narrow 
interpretation was judicially applied to the pharmaceutical industry, Congress stepped 
in to provide the industry with special relief. 22 The Supreme Court's interpretation of 
that congressional act may now have the effect of expanding the common law 
experimental use exception in certain circumstances. 
17. See Mueller, supra note 3, at 19. 
18. For a listing of more of the older cases on the doctrine, see generally 5-16 DONALD S. CHISUM, 
CHISUM ON PATENTS§ 16.03 (2004). 
19. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). 
20. Id. at 1121. 
21. Indeed, a review of cases reveals that the defense has defeated a patent infringement claim in only 
four instances and without much discussion from the courts on the reasons for such defeat. See Chesterfield 
v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371,376 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (finding the experimental use exception applicable 
when alloy was used only for testing and for experimental purposes); Dugan v. Lear A via, 55 F. Supp. 223, 
229 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (holding one device non-infringing under the experimental use exception because it 
was not manufactured for sale); Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., 18 F. Supp. 305, 333 (N.D. W. Va. 
193 7) ( finding experimental use exception applicable when testing was done before going into commercial 
production); Finney v. United States, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 33, 35 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div. 1975) (finding the 
experimental use exception applicable where NASA used patented glove once during training experiment). 
The low number of successful cases utilizing the defense may also be attributable to patentees simply 
choosing not to sue those infringers whose activities are truly experimental within the narrow boundaries 
provided by the courts. As this Article suggests, there is a self-regulating mechanism in place that guides 
enforcement of the experimental use exception. See infra Part N. 
22. See infra text accompanying notes 75-76. 
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A. Profit or Financial Gain 
The earliest cases creating the experimental use exception arose in the commercial 
context, involving businesses. It would not be until a century later that a case involving 
an academic institution, albeit indirectly, would arise, 23 and then another sixty-five 
years would pass before Madey v. Duke University24 would specifically address 
academic institutions. This trend is notable in the context of the arguments made here 
because it demonstrates how rarely universities have confronted a legal battle on this 
issue. The timing also seems significant insofar as the most recent ruling arrived after 
the courts shifted the focus of their analysis from a profit or financial gain inquiry to 
a broader furtherance of ongoing business interests determination. Accordingly, even 
knowing nothing else about the case law, one would have expected (perhaps more 
easily in hindsight) the Madey court to rule as it did. 
Originally, the courts focused on whether the alleged infringer intended to profit 
from the use of another's patent. If he did, the experimental use exception did not 
apply. Ever present throughout these early discussions was consideration of the effect 
on the patentee's exclusive rights. In Sawin v. Guild,25 Justice Story again applied the 
experimental use exception to exempt alleged patent infringers who had no profit 
motive. 26 Finding for the defendant, he concluded that those who use the patented 
invention "for mere purpose of philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity and 
exactness of the specification" describing the invention, would not be held liable for 
patent infringement. 27 Drawing the line at the intent to profit made sense to this court 
because only those who infringe patents with the intent to profit financially actually 
deprive the patent owner of his "lawful rewards" preserved by the patent. 28 
Accordingly, this case established the profit motive as the key determinant of whether 
the experimental use exception would exempt the alleged infringing activity. 29 
About fifty years later, in 1861, another court set out the current test for 
experimental use in Poppenhusen v. Falke.30 The court clarified that courts had 
accepted the experimental use defense when the alleged infringing activity was "for the 
sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement." 31 
This test formed the current "truly narrow" experimental use exception, immunizing 
only those patent infringers seeking amusement or verifying that the invention worked 
as it should-not those motivated by financial gain. 
In 1935, with Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co.,32 the first case involving 
the experimental use exception in the academic research context was decided. 
However, the defendant in Ruth was not an academic institution; rather, the defendant 
company illegally sold parts for a patented flotation device to several customers, 
23. See infra text accompanying notes 32-36. 
24. 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
25. 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391). 
26. Id. at 555. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Mueller, supra note 3, at 20. 
30. 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279). 
31. Id. 
32. 13 F. Supp. 697, 703 (D. Colo. 1935), rev 'don other grounds, 87 F.2d 35 (I 0th Cir. 1936). 
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including the Colorado School of Mines. 33 Customers who purchased these parts were 
able to use the improved device instead of purchasing a new instrument. 34 Although 
finding the defendant liable for contributory patent infringement, the district court 
exempted the sales to the Colorado School of Mines because the school used its 
instruments in conducting research. 35 
Consistent with its financial gain analysis, the court reasoned that because the 
school derived no financial benefit from the use of the patented device, its infringing 
research activities fell within the experimental use exception. 36 Academic institutions 
have interpreted this decision as providing them with broad protection from patent 
infringement when they engage in research. Indeed, most academic institutions freely 
infringed patents until 2002, when the Federal Circuit clarified the scope of the 
exemption in Madey. 37 
B. Furthering Business Interests 
I. Experimental Use and the Pharmaceutical Industry 
The experimental use analysis soon shifted, considering not just the alleged 
infringer's profit motive but also whether the use occurred in the course of business. 
Accompanying this shift was the recognition that any use (not just profitable use) of 
the patentee's exclusive rights was harmful and in violation of patent laws. That 
rationale is clear in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,38 in which the 
Federal Circuit applied the experimental use exception to the pharmaceutical 
industry.39 Bolar used Roche's patented drug compound to develop a generic version 
of one of Roche's drugs.40 Bolar was required by law to delay manufacturing the 
generic drug until Roche's patent expired; however, Bolar began the drug testing 
process (which sometimes takes several years) before the patent's expiration in order 
to obtain approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).41 Bolar argued that 
its testing ofRoche's drug during that period was purely experimental, but the Federal 
Circuit disagreed and held that Bolar infringed Roche's patents-Bolar would not be 
saved by the experimental use exception. 42 
According to the Federal Circuit, Bolar's use of the patented drug during testing 
violated the plain meaning of "use" in the Patent Act.43 The court noted that use of a 
patented invention alone, without a showing that the patent-holder suffered damage or 
lost sales, was sufficient to make out a case of patent infringement. 44 The fact that 
33. Id. at 699. 
34. Id. at 710. 
35. Id. at 703. 
36. Id. at 713. 
37. 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003);see infra Part II.B.2. 
38. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984). 
39. Id. at 858. 
40. Id. at 863 
41. Id. at 860. 
42. Id. at 858. 
43. Id. at 863. 
44. Id. at 86 I. 
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Bolar's activities, at the time of the lawsuit, caused no financial loss to Roche (since 
the drug had not been marketed or sold) was not sufficient to afford it immunity under 
the experimental use exception.45 Rather, the court noted Bolar's intent to profit in the 
future, a disqualification from experimental use protection. 46 
It seemed important to the Roche court that Bolar' s drug testing activity fell within 
its ordinary course of business.47 The court noted that Bolar's use was "solely for 
business reasons and not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly 
philosophical inquiry."48 The court held that "unlicensed experiments conducted with 
a view to the adoption of the patented invention to the experimenter's business is a 
violation of the rights of the patentee to exclude others from using his patented 
invention." 49 This language and focus on the "ordinary course ofbusiness" would later 
prove important in the Madey decision applying the experimental use exception to 
academic institutions. The Roche court emphasized that it would not allow infringing 
activities to be masked as experimental use when such activities have "definite, 
cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes. "50 The court noted the lack of 
precedential support for permitting infringing activities that contributed to the 
infringers' business interests. 51 
The Federal Circuit again reaffirmed the "very narrow" scope of the experimental 
use exception in Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp. 52 The plaintiff, Embrex, 
was the exclusive licensee of a patented machine for vaccinating chicks before they 
hatched. 53 Defendant Service Engineering designed a similar machine. 54 In defending 
against the patent infringement claim by Embrex, Service Engineering argued that its 
activities merely involved testing its own machine.55 Holding Service Engineering 
liable for patent infringement, the court found these tests were conducted "expressly 
for commercial purposes" and did not fit within the "very narrow" experimental use 
exemption. 56 
The court reiterated that the experimental use exception would only apply to 
activities done "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or strictly philosophical 
inquiry" and would not apply to any use conducted under the "guise of scientific 
inquiry." 57 Additional clarification on the meaning of that phrase would arrive two 
years later in a case against Duke University. 58 
45. Id. at 862-63. 
46. Id. at 863. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
53. Id. at 1346. 
54. Id. at 1346-47. 
55. Id. at 1349. 
56. Id. at 1349-50. 
57. Id. 
58. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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2. Madey v. Duke University: Laying Down the Law for Universities 
This case is significant, in part, because it was the first infringement decision by 
the Federal Circuit that held an academic research institution liable for infringement 
for using a patented technology in the course of its own research. 59 Indeed, many 
commentators believe the court rendered the exception worthless to academic 
institutions. 60 I believe the case is also significant because it was the first patent 
infringement action against an academic institution to reach the Federal Circuit. 61 
The Federal Circuit in Madey found Duke University liable for patent 
infringement when Duke continued to use Professor Madey's patented laser after he 
left the university. 62 The trial court had held that Duke's use of the patented laser for 
basic scientific research was not aimed at commercial ventures and was thus exempted 
under the experimental use exception. 63 However, the Federal Circuit held that Duke's 
own patent policies verified the use of the laser as furthering its "legitimate business 
objectives." 64 The court refused to adopt the trial court's broad interpretation of the 
experimental use exception as applying to any research for academic, experimental, or 
non-profit purposes. 65 
The court explained that Duke's status as a non-profit institution was not 
determinative, since such academic institutions frequently conduct research with little 
or no commercial value. 66 Rather, the court focused on Duke's "legitimate business 
objectives, including educating and enlightening students and faculty," and the 
university's research which "increase[s] the status of the institution and lure[s] 
lucrative research grants, students and faculty." 67 
Indeed, the court characterized Duke as a business and all research done at the 
university as Duke's line of business, thus removing the research-and any patent 
infringement that occurs in the research-from the experimental use exception. 68 This 
focus on whether the activity furthered the alleged infringer's legitimate business 
interests is not new; rather, it is entirely consistent with prior opinions. For instance, 
as early as 1974, the Court of Federal Claims, 69 ruling on patent infringement cases 
against the U.S. government's use of allegedly infringing aircraft, found that the 
experimental use exception did not apply because the use furthered the legitimate 
business of the using agency. 70 
59. Id. at 1361---63. 
60. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1019. 
61. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
62. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1361---63. 
63. Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 F. Supp. 2d 420, 426-28 (M.D.N.C. 2001). 
64. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362. 
65. Id. at 1361---62. 
66. Id. at 1362. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. The United States Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement 
actions against the U.S. government. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000). 
70. See Douglas v. United States, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 170, 176-77 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div. 1974); see also 
lnfigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 981 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (refusing to apply 
experimental use exception to exempt defendant's cloning experiments because "they were done as part of 
the ongoing business activities of defendant .... "); Pitcairn v. United States, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 35, 47 
(Ct. Cl. Trial Div. 1975). 
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Moreover, the court viewed Duke's own policies regarding the patenting of 
research conducted at the university as part of its business objective. 71 Duke was, to the 
court, "not shy" about attaining licenses for its patented work; such licensing revenue 
contributed to Duke's "legitimate business." 72 There seemed to be an implication that 
Duke intended to profit from the laser at some point in the future. The court pointed 
out that some of the key evidence in the case was dismissed by the district court, 
including a statement from Duke's laser lab web site that expressed interest in 
corporate partnerships and Duke's establishment of an hourly fee for any non-academic 
laser users. 73 The Madey decision is seen as effectively precluding academic 
institutions from using the experimental use exception. 74 
C. The Hatch-Waxman Act: Legislature Overturns Roche 
The Roche decision caused an uproar because of the perceived damaging 
implications for generic drug makers and ultimately for consumers. If generic drugs 
could not be tested during the life of the patented drug, they would not be able to reach 
the market until years after the expiration of the patent term on the pioneer drug. 75 
Congress stepped in to overturn Roche, enacting the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. 76 
1. Description of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
The Hatch-Waxman Act is a codified version of the experimental use exception 
for the pharmaceutical industry. 77 The statute, in relevant part, provides that it is not 
"an act of [patent] infringement to ... use ... a patented invention ... solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal 
law which regulates the ... use ... of drugs .... "78 The Act provides a safe harbor, 
permitting drug manufacturers to perform experiments needed to obtain FDA approval 
of their drugs, even if those experiments are conducted during the patent life of a 
patented drug being tested-an otherwise infringing use. 79 In addition, the Act 
lengthens the patent term for drugs requiring FDA approval before entering the 
market. 80 It also exempts certain activities that would otherwise amount to 
infringement. 81 
The Act is intended to achieve some balance between the competing interests of 
the patent-holder on the one hand and those of the generic drug maker on the other. It 
grants an extension to the original patent-holder's patent term, since several years of 
71. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362 n.7. 
72. Id. at 1363 n.7. 
73. Id. at 1356 n.5. 
74. See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at I 019. 
75. A pioneer drug is the patented drug; a generic is the non-patented version of the pioneer drug. See 
Abbott Lab. v. Zenith Lab., Inc., 36 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1801, 1805 (N.D. lll. 1995). 
76. Mueller, supra note 3, at 25. 
77. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(l) (2000). 
78. Id. 
79. Id.§§ 156,271. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
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the patent's original term were lost during the FDA approval process and before the 
drug entered the market. 82 In exchange, generic drug manufacturers may use the 
original patented drug during testing, permitting the drug to complete the FDA 
approval process and be ready for market release as soon as the original patent 
expires.83 The Act provides that making, using, or selling a patented invention "solely 
for uses reasonably related" to gathering data in order to acquire approval under the 
federal laws that regulate drug manufacture, use, or sale is not an act of patent 
infringement. 84 
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Act to cover more than drugs; it also 
covers testing of medical devices, which, like pharmaceuticals, are subject to a lengthy 
FDA approval process. 85 The Court reasoned that the sections of the Act are 
complementary in that all of the products eligible for a patent term extension under 
section 201 of the Act are also subject to section 202 's exemption for early testing. 86 
Thus, medical devices, food additives, color additives, new drugs, antibiotic drugs, 
infant formula, 87 and human biological products (all of which are subject to pre-market 
approval by the FDA) are covered under the testing exemption.88 Accordingly, patent-
holders of both drugs and medical devices must tolerate the infringing activities of 
competitors who conduct FDA approval tests prior to the expiration of the patent 
terms.89 
2. The Supreme Court Interprets the Hatch-Waxman Act 
Recently, in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences L Ltd.,90 the U.S. Supreme Court 
considered early pre-clinical studies conducted by Merck that were not ultimately 
included in' submissions to the FDA. 91 The Court held these studies exempt under the 
safe harbor provision. 92 The Court vacated the judgment of the Federal Circuit, 93 which 
had reasoned that the experiments did not receive safe harbor protection because they 
had not been included in FDA submissions and constituted merely "general biomedical 
research to identify new pharmaceutical compounds." 94 
The Supreme Court noted that early in the experimentation and testing process, 
it is difficult to ascertain what will ultimately be submitted to the FDA because of the 
trial and error inherent in the process. 95 The exception is generic drugs, because it is 
known at the outset that a particular compound, which is identical-to the drug already 
82. Id.§ 271(e)(I). 
83. Id. See generally 5 DONALDS. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS,§ 16.03[1] (2004). 
84. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e). 
85. See Eli Lilly& Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661,671 (1990). 
86. Id. at 673. 
87. Id. at 674 n.6. 
88. Id. at 673-74. 
89. Id. at 673. 
90. 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
91. Id. at 195. 
92. Id. at 208. 
93. Id. 
94. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
95. Merck, 545 U.S. at 206. 
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approved, will be submitted to the FDA.96 Accordingly, the Supreme Court reasoned 
that the rule espoused by the Federal Circuit would limit the safe harbor to generics 
only, an interpretation that the Court rejected. 97 Instead, the Court focused on the 
phrase "reasonably related," interpreting it broadly to cover all activity that one 
intending to develop a particular drug has a reasonable basis for believing may be 
included in a submission to the FDA ifsuccessful. 98 The fact that the experiment may 
prove unsuccessful is not relevant. 99 
While the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of section 271(e)(l) 
represents a victory for those wishing to conduct testing in order to obtain regulatory 
approval before the expiration of a patent, the ruling will likely have a negative effect 
on drug research patents. Arguably, these research patents will lose most, if not all, of 
their commercial value. 100 
III. THE BAYH-DOLE ACT AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
Historically, the federal government owned all rights to research sponsored by 
federal funds; such research typically was not patented because it was considered 
"public research." 101 While "public research" was immediately and freely available to 
the public, "commercial research" funded by private investment was kept secret until 
patented and able to generate revenue by license. 102 Congress recognized that the 
collaboration between scientific research and business would allow rapid and efficient 
commercial development of basic research. 103 
In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent 
Procedures Act (the "Bayh-Dole Act"), which allowed private ownership of patented 
inventions resulting from research funded by the federal govemment. 104 It permitted 
universities, small businesses, and nonprofit institutions to hold patents on the 
inventions they generated with public money. 105 Its purpose was to accelerate the 
development of inventions that would benefit the public. 106 The federal government 
retained some rights to the inventions, but assigned most of its property rights to the 
96. Id. 
91. Id. 
98. Id. at 206-07. The Court articulated its test as follows: "At least where a drugmaker has a 
reasonable basis for believing that a patented compound may work, through a particular biological process, 
to produce a particular physiological effect, and uses the compound in research that, if successful, would 
be appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA, that use is 'reasonably related' to the 'development 
and submission of information under ... Federal law."' Id. at 207. 
99. Id. 
100. If one can infringe drug research patents without consequence, and there is no other use for these 
patented tools, then there is virtually no incentive for one to invest in obtaining these patents. See Brief for 
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15-19, Merck 
KGaA v. lntegra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237) [hereinafter Wisconsin Amicus 
Brief]. 
IOI. See Tamsen Valoir, Government Funded Inventions: The Bayh-Dole Act and the Hopkins v. 
Cel/Pro March-In Rights Controversy, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 211, 211-12 (2000). 
102. Id. at 212. 
103. Id. at 213. 
104. 35 u.s.c. §§ 200-212 (2000). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. § 200. 
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research labs. 107 This Act recognizes the great public value of allowing academic 
institutions to pursue commercial development of their federally funded research. 108 
The Act has fueled a major change with respect to universities and patents. As one 
commentator notes, "universities have become players in the patent system in a way 
that could hardly have been imagined before the Bayh-Dole Act." 109 
A. Changes in Attitude About University Discoveries 
Money changes everything. That phrase encapsulates the new trend in university 
research. The fact that university research now had commercial value ushered in a new 
attitude toward research and patenting. While at one time the premise was that basic 
research should be freely available to everyone, now that discoveries could have 
commercial value and financial rewards, it became more important to treat research as 
private property. 110 Additionally, before the Bayh-Dole Act, federally sponsored 
university research generally required the assignment of patents to the government and 
free licensing to all those interested. 111 Now, however, universities could keep royalties 
and licensing fees. As a result, a stream of revenue arrived at a time when government 
funds for research were decreasing and universities' need for additional funding was 
increasing. 112 On an individual level, inventors were then also able to share royalties 
with the university, further adding to their profit incentives, and perhaps affecting 
which experiments were pursued. 113 Together, these factors, among others, have 
changed patenting activity and the research business at universities. 
B. Universities Profit From Patent Licenses 
The Bayh-Dole Act can be seen as a mandate to universities to obtain patents and 
commercialize their inventions, a mandate that universities have taken seriously over 
the last twenty years. 114 Its impact on the business of university research is enormous. 
While in 1981 universities were awarded 436 patents, by 2001 that annual figure 
climbed to 3,203. 115 Sizeable revenues have also accompanied the growth in university 
107. Id. § 202(c)(4) ("With respect to any invention in which the contractor elects rights, the Federal 
agency shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced 
for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout the world .... "). 
108. See id. 
109. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1018. 
110. See Suzanne T. Michel, Comment, The Experimental Use Exception to Infringement Applied to 
Federally Funded Inventions, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 378-79 (1992). 
111. See generally Valoir, supra note 101. 
112. See I National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2002, at 0-11 (2002), available 
at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind02/pdf7volumel .pdf. In the early l 960s, the federal government began 
a trend of compensating for a continually shrinking share of federal research and development funds. By 
1979, the federal share fell below fifty percent and declined even more steeply during the 1990s. Since the 
second half of the 1980s, federal research and development actually declined after adjusting for inflation. 
Additionally, federal research and development was essentially flat during the past decade. Id.; see also 
Michel, supra note 110, at 379. 
I 13. See Michel, supra note I 10, at 380. 
114. See Wisconsin Amicus Brief, supra note 100, at 19-21. 
115. See 2 National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2004, A5-l 03, A5-l 05 (2004), 
available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/sceind04/pdf _ v2.htrnl [hereinafter National Science Board 2004]. 
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patents: 16 In 1997, universities earned about $500 million in gross revenues from 
patents. 117 A 2002 survey of 156 colleges and universities revealed that the institutions 
earned almost $1 billion in combined licensing revenues that year. 118 
One need look no further than the biotechnology industry over the last few years 
to see the strong influence of university patent ownership. "[T]he biotechnology 
industry as we know it today began on university campuses in the United States." 119 
Universities have served as sources of numerous patent biomedical inventions as well 
as founders or affiliates of start-up firms based on their patents. 120 Public and private 
universities receive about one billion dollars in gross license revenues from their 
intellectual property. 121 For instance, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
received $5.5 million in licensing fees in 1991.122 These figures illustrate the increasing 
collaboration between university research and private enterprise that the Bayh-Dole 
Act was meant to achieve. 
C. Universities Enforce Their Patent Rights 
Along with the growth in their patent portfolios, universities have aggressively 
enforced their patents in court. Many of these lawsuits have led to very large settlement 
or damages awards. A few are mentioned here. The University of California sued 
Genentech and settled for $200 million. 123 The University of Minnesota sued Glaxo 
W ellcome and won a $300 million settlement. 124 Emory University just recently 
collected $540 million in royalty fees (believed to be the largest settlement for a 
university to date) to settle litigation on some drug patents. 125 Several other universities 
including Cornell University, 126 Columbia University, 127 Harvard, 128 the Massachusetts 
116. Universities with highly successful patents realize larger profits than most other institutions, whose 
licensing revenues tend to constitute a smaller part-approximately four percent---0f their budget. See Amy 
Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University 
Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 103 I, 1087-88 (2005). 
117. I National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2000, at 6-5 7 (2000), available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind00/c6/c06.pdf(During 1989-90, the reported income flows from licenses 
totaled a mere $82 million, reaching $483 million in 1997.). 
I 18. Ass'n of Univ. Tech. Managers, AUTM Licensing Survey: FY 2002 62 (Ashley J. Stevens ed., 
2003), available at http://www.autm.net/events/file/surveys/02 _abridged_ survey.pd[ [hereinafter AUTM 
Licensing Survey]; see also Susie Poppick, Yale Keeps Patent Stats Secret, YALE DAILY NEWS, Dec. 8, 
2004, available at http://www.yaledailynews.com/article.asp?AID=27658. 
119. Wisconsin Amicus Brief, supra note JOO, at 3. 
120. John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, 
in Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy 285,286 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) 
[hereinafter Walsh et al., Effects]. 
121. AUTM Licensing Survey, supra note 120, at 62. 
122. Michel, supra note I I 0, at 380 n.59. 
123. Marcia Barinaga, Genentech, UC Settle Suit for $200 Million, 286 SCIENCE 1655 (1999). 
124. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1036 (D. Minn. 
I 999). 
125. Meredith Hobbs, A $540M Payday Caps Patent Fight, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 8, 2005, at 8. 
126. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370F.3d 1354, 1359(Fed. Cir. 2004)(action 
for patent infringement brought by plaintiffs including Creative Technologies, Inc., a representative of the 
University of Colorado and Cornell University). 
127. In re Columbia Univ. Patent Litig., 330 F. Supp. 2d 18, 18 (D. Mass. 2004). 
128. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly& Co., No. 02-11280-RWZ, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 3170, at *1-*2 
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Institute of Technology, 129 and University of Rochester 130 have also sued to enforce 
their patents. Sometimes, a university may even appear as a co-plaintiff with a 
corporation on one patent and a defendant against it on another.131 In 2004, the 
University of Colorado and Cornell University were awarded a $2.1 million judgment 
and $4.5 million in damages and interest against Laboratory Corporation of America. 132 
Interestingly, universities do not appear to be suing each other for patent 
infringement. 133 
D. Relationships with Industry 
Universities are now partners and collaborators with industry. For instance, a few 
years after passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, a study revealed that industry funded about 
twenty-five percent of all biotechnology research at universities. 134 Today, that number 
has likely increased in all areas. 135 
Companies enjoy this access to university researchers as it enhances their 
competitive position. Industry involvement takes various forms: (i) the university 
could be under contract to conduct specific experiments; (ii) the university could pro-
vide continuing education to a company's researchers; (iii) the university could have 
a grant directed at a specific researcher or project; (iv) the university may form a 
review board that includes corporate members to decide which university projects will 
be funded; or (v) the university's professors may enter commercial ventures (such as 
starting companies or partnering with venture capitalists to commercialize research). 136 
(D. Mass. Mar. 3, 2004) (action for patent infringement brought by plaintiffs including MIT and Harvard). 
129. Mass. Inst. ofTech. v. Lockheed Martin Global Telecomms., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1007 (D. 
Mass. 2003); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Speedera Networks, Inc., No.02-10188-RWZ, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15903, at *1-*2 (D. Mass. Aug. 26, 2002). 
130. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216,220 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). 
131. Compare Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. IP 02-0512-C-B/S, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14724, at *2-*3 (S.D. Ind. July 29, 2004) (action by Eli Lilly & Co. for pharmaceutical patent 
infringement with MIT as an involuntary plaintiff), with Ariad Pharms., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3170, 
at* 1-*2 (action by MIT against Eli Lilly & Co. for pharmaceutical patent infringement). As a general rule, 
a patent owner must join the exclusive licensee of the patent in any infringement action brought by the 
licensee. See Erbamont Inc. v. Cetus Corp., 720 F. Supp. 387,393 (D. Del. 1989). 
132. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Arn. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
133. See infra Part IV.C. The infringement suits in which universities are defendants tend to be 
declaratory judgment actions where the plaintiff seeks a ruling that the university's patent is invalid (after 
the university has filed or threatened to file an infringement action). See, e.g., Medlmmune, Inc. v. 
Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Synbiotics Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Nos. 
93-1253, 94-1079, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23902, at *I (Fed. Cir. Aug. 29, 1994); New Star Lasers, Inc. 
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1241 (E.D. Cal. 1999). 
134. David Blumenthal et al., Industrial Support a/University Research in Biotechnology, 231 SCIENCE 
242, 244 (I 986). 
135. Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-Developed 
Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453,479 (1997). 
136. Michel, supra note 110, at 38 I. 
All of the earliest genetic engineering companies were founded by professors who completed 
the initial research in university laboratories. For instance Genentech, co-founded by Herbert 
Boyer to exploit the Cohen-Boyer gene splicing patent, did not have a laboratory in its early 
stages, so Boyer's campus laboratories at UCSF were used. 
Id. at 382. 
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IV. THE PRACTICAL REALITY: RESEARCH WILL LIVE ON 
Despite the cries ofimpending doom, the Madey decision does not signal the death 
of research and innovation in universities. In reality, the decision will probably have 
little effect on the way researchers conduct their day-to-day business. 137 This is mostly 
because the research marketplace will continue to guide and control the conduct of 
researchers and patent-holders ( especially considering the frequent role reversal of 
these parties), thus providing an appropriate balance between enforcing patent rights 
and allowing innovation. In a recent survey, none of the respondents reported having 
to discontinue projects because of problems involved in obtaining intellectual property 
rights for their research. 138 Instead, they have adopted "working solutions" to 
intellectual property issues in their research. 139 
One of the ironies of the controversy surrounding the experimental use exception 
is that the Madey decision is both a blessing and a curse for universities. On the one 
hand, universities criticize the narrowness of the exception, particularly its elimination 
of the long held ( albeit erroneous) belief in their immunity from patent infringement 
for research activities. On the other hand, however, as major patent-holders, 
universities benefit from a strict and narrow interpretation of the exception. Millions 
of dollars in licensing revenues and royalties would be lost, for instance, if all research 
were exempted from infringement until commercialized. 
There are several considerations, discussed more fully below, that alone and in 
conjunction effectively self-regulate the business of university research. These factors 
permit university researchers to experiment without much fear of suit, particularly 
where their activities are not commercial or profit-making in nature. Further, the 
innovation process in practice, especially to the extent that universities are involved, 
is not one of exclusive competition but rather one of cooperation and sharing of 
research information. 140 Together, these factors ensure that research and innovation will 
continue to thrive. 
13 7. See Cristina Weschler, Note, The Informal Experimental Use Exception: University Research After 
Madeyv. Duke University, 79N.Y.U. L. REV. 1536, 1552-{i2 (2004)(discussing how non-legal solutions 
protect university research). 
138. John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021 (2003)[hereinafter 
Walsh et al., Working]. 
139. Id. These solutions include (i) obtaining licenses from patent-holders, (ii) developing and 
participating in public and quasi-public databases that make information available, (iii) inventing around 
patents, (iv) going overseas, (v) filing suit against patent-holders (e.g., seeking a declaratory judgment), and 
(vi) using the technology without a license (a practice that is admittedly very common among university 
researchers). Id. 
140. Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad 
Exception, I 00 YALE L.J. 2169, 2181 ( 1991 ). Obviously, there are occasions when the general culture of 
sharing breaks down. In Madey v. Duke University, for instance, Madey chose to sue his former employer, 
rather than allow it to continue to use his lasers. 307 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002). While we may not 
be privy to the specific motivations and deliberations in that case, one can imagine that there may have been 
underlying difficulties in their relationship, perhaps leading to, or as a result of, Madey's separation from 
employment with the university. Absent these kinds of tensions, however, the spirit of cooperation ought 
to prevail. 
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A. The Effect of Merck v. Integra 
The ultimate effect of the Merck opinion on the common law experimental use 
exception is that it provides a wide exemption that serves to enlarge the experimental 
use exception when the research involves a use protected under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act. 141 Interestingly, one of the beneficiaries of the opinion will be universities. To the 
extent the opinion can be read as permitting all drug experimentation, not only for 
generics but for pioneer drugs as well, 142 research universities benefit directly when 
their research includes the development of new drugs. Moreover, because the safe 
harbor provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act extends not only to submissions to the 
FDA but also to research reasonably related to submission under a federal program, 
Merck casts a wide net of exemptions, all to the benefit of research universities. 143 
Granted, the opinion does not eradicate the narrow effects under Madey, in that it does 
not cover all of the kinds of research that may be conducted at universities, but it does 
provide some immunity to areas that heretofore would not have been protected under 
the experimental use exception. 
B. Licensing: Just Ask Nicely 
It has become commonplace among university researchers to use patented devices 
without seeking a license. 144 At the risk of stating the obvious, university researchers 
(like all others) need to ask for a license in order to use a patented invention as 
required by law. Although additional costs may accompany such a request, to complain 
about those costs does not provide a sufficiently compelling reason to grant an 
exception. Just as a long-time tax evader earns no sympathy when the time arrives to 
make payments to the Internal Revenue Service, universities' complaints about now 
having to pay licensing fees are unpersuasive. 
Licensing is a routine and integral part of the intellectual property business. 145 
Indeed, most universities already have technology transfer offices that handle 
intellectual property issues, including licensing arrangements, 146 with an indicator of 
success measured by licensing revenue. 147 Granted, seeking out and obtaining licenses 
may prove cumbersome; however, such difficulty in and of itself should not serve as 
a reason for noncompliance. 148 
I 41. See supra Part 11.C.1. 
142. A pioneer drug is the patented drug; a generic is the non-patented version of the pioneer drug. See 
Abbott Labs. v. Zenith Labs., 934 F. Supp. 925, 931 (N.D. III. 1995). 
143. The Act has already been interpreted to cover medical devices. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 
496 U.S. 661,664,679 (1990). 
144. Walsh et al., Working, supra note 138, at 1021. In the Walsh study, all of the university respondents 
admitted using patented research tools without permission at times. 
145. See Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., An Overview of the Virginia UC/TA, 8 RICH. J.L. & TECH. I, 8 (2001), 
available at http://law.richrnond.edu/jolt/v8il/articlel.htrnl. 
I 46. See Kapczynski et al., supra note 116, at 1080-81. 
147. Id. at 1085. 
148. Universities may be able to devise a relatively accessible procedure for their researchers to obtain 
licenses by posting guidelines or forms on their websites. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. System of Intellectual 
Property Reference Page, http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/index.htrn (last visited Mar. 
6, 2007). 
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Further, the fear that research will be hampered because researchers will need to 
spend all their time tracking down patents and negotiating licenses is misplaced. In 
practice, very few licenses need to be negotiated on any given project. 149 Although 
many potentially applicable patents may need to be reviewed at the outset, of those, 
only a few will actually be relevant, and in the end, a handful or less will need to be 
licensed. 150 With respect to costs, universities also have an advantage in that many 
patent-holders provide discounted licenses to universities, often for less than half the 
market rate. 151 
There also does not appear to be any evidence that patent-holders will impede 
research by unreasonably refusing to grant licenses to universities. 152 To the contrary, 
denied access to intellectual property rights very rarely leads to the termination of a 
worthwhile project. 153 Rather, other considerations, such as lack of confidence in the 
technical success of the project, market demand, and limited internal resources, 
account for the decision to discontinue a project. 154 Even in the rare instance where a 
project might be terminated because of licensing difficulties, one commentator has 
suggested that the social cost of not pursuing projects is low, given the vast array of 
other available projects. 155 
Another market force facilitating cooperation among researchers seeking licenses 
is the repetitive nature of the licensing game. A licensing negotiation between a 
university and a patent-holder is often not a one-time event; the parties may find 
themselves in the future negotiating (or may already have negotiated) other patents, 
and it is important that they show respect for the quid pro quo by maintaining a good 
relationship and remaining reasonable. 156 
Licensing could have avoided the litigation in both Madey and Merck. In Madey, 
Duke argued that it had a license under grants received by the federal government, but 
none of the pertinent contracts defined the scope of these rights. 157 Accordingly, the 
university's rights to the invention were not clearly delineated. The better practice 
would have entailed negotiating a license from Madey, the inventor, to Duke at the 
outset ofMadey's employment. 158 In Merck, the parties attempted but failed to reach 
a license agreement. 159 To the extent such failure occurred because the patent-holder 
149. Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 120, at 294. 
150. Id. at 294-95. 
151. Weschler, supra note 137, at 1553-55. 
152. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology 
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177,219 (1987); Sandstrom, supra note 5, at 1103. 
153. Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 120, at 298. 
154. Id. at 298, 304. One respondent in the Walsh survey said, "I am hard pressed to think of a piece of 
research that we haven't done because of blocked access to a research tool." Id. at 298. 
155. See id. at 305. 
Some respondents have suggested that the value of targets has actually declined substantially 
because companies can't exploit all of the targets they have, and so firms are more willing 
to license some of their targets, or abandon some of their patents and Jet the inventions shift 
to the public domain, because maintaining large portfolios oflow-value patents is expensive. 
Id. at 305. 
I 56. Id. at 326. 
157. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
158. See infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
159. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860,863 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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was unreasonable, it provides a lesson to patent-holders in licensing negotiations: be 
cooperative, or you may Jose big, not only in the eventual outcome, but also through 
the very expensive and risky litigation process. 160 
The National Academy of Sciences (the Academy), which has no legal authority 
but wields influence over particular scientific journals, issued a decree in early 2003, 
urging, among other things, the licensing of patented materials. 161 The organization 
also encourages patent-holders to issue equal license fees to everyone, regardless of 
whether the request comes from academia or industry because "[ t ]here is no clear line 
between the 'for-profit sector' and 'academic' research." 162 When granting exclusive 
licenses to industry, however, universities must be mindful that they may want to 
reserve some of their rights in order to permit future licensing to those in the academic 
community. 163 While it is too early to tell if the scientific community will abide by its 
own policy, the Academy's decree reflects a sign of the cooperative spirit that 
underlies academic research. 
C. Tolerating Universities ' Patent Infringement 
Madey is the first case in which a university was sued for patent infringement. 164 
That telling statement supports my argument that universities are not likely to be sued 
for infringement. Even in Madey, the facts are unusual because the case arose not out 
of the typical situation where a competitor sues another, but out of an employer-
employee dispute. 165 
The points below help to explain why universities are unlikely to be sued for 
patent infringement. Indeed, universities tend to ignore notification of infringement 
letters, particularly when they are not engaging in commercially related research. 166 
One commentator notes that "[s]o long as the university is not generating revenue 
based on the patented technology, universities appear to be largely left alone, although 
some firms will send letters." 167 Universities are also not inclined to sue each other, 
especially when the alleged infringer is not commercializing the innovation. 168 
160. For many plaintiffs, the risk that the patent at suit will be invalidated is a high and very real risk. 
See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216, 234 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(invalidating the university's drug patent). 
161. Committee on Responsibilities of Authorship in the Biological Sciences, Nat'!. Acad. Sci., Sharing 
Publication-Related Data and Materials: Responsibilities of Authorship in the Life Sciences 7 (2003), 
available at http://fermat.nap.edu/books/0309088593/htmVRl .html (last visited Mar. 6, 2007). 
I 62. Id. at 67. 
163. See Kapczynski et al., supra note I 16, at 1076. 
164. The infringement suits in which universities are defendants tend to be declaratory judgment actions 
where the plaintiff seeks a ruling that the university's patent is invalid (after the university has filed or 
threatened to file an infringement action). See, e.g., Medlmmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3d 1376, 
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Synbiotics Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 32 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1835, 1836 
(Fed. Cir. 1994); New Star Lasers & Laser Aesthetics, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 
1240, 1241 (E.D. Cal. 1999); see also supra note 124. 
165. Usually the employer retains the patent rights to inventions, but in this case the inventor owned the 
rights. When he changed employers, there was no license given to the new employer. See RONALD B. 
HILDRETH, PATENT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE§ I :8.5 (3d ed. 1999). 
166. See Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 120, at 317. 
167. Id. at 319. 
168. See id. at 327. 
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1. The Honor System 
Common sense dictates that it is simply not possible for patent-holders to monitor 
the activities of researchers and scientists in their private labs. The system relies on an 
honor system of sorts requiring the researchers themselves to come forward, seek out 
the patent-holder, and ask for permission. When research becomes public (generally 
through publication) and/or commercialized, infringement becomes easier for a patent-
holder to detect. In addition, many researchers may choose to wait until that time to 
seek permission from patent-holders. 169 In some cases, the six-year statute of 
limitations 170 may expire before infringement is even discovered. 171 
2. Difficulties of Litigation 
While in theory it may appear easy (based on the definition of infringement) for 
a patent-holder to vindicate her rights where a university or other party has infringed 
them, the reality is far different. This is due to the costs, both financial and otherwise, 
of patent litigation. For starters, a potential plaintiff contemplating filing suit must 
consider the time and cost involved; such a suit may not be resolved for years and 
could cost millions of dollars in attorney's fees alone, with no guarantee of success. 172 
It is also important that the patentee be able to recover significant damages in 
order to make this endeavor worthwhile. Thus, where a patented invention, although 
infringed, has not generated profits or proven commercially successful, it simply does 
not make sense to pursue aggressively an infringement claim. This grants universities 
de facto immunity for purely research-related infringement activities that do not 
generate revenues for the institution. 
In addition to the time and energy one expends worrying about each step of the 
case, there is also the time drain on all the individuals associated with the patented 
invention. For instance, everyone in the patent-holder's organization may be involved 
in discovery, searching and copying years of files and preparing and responding to 
written and oral discovery. 173 The patentee also takes the risk that the patent at suit will 
be invalidated, an occurrence that is not uncommon. 174 
3. University Relationships Are Important 
For a host of intangible reasons, a culture of not suing universities appears to exist. 
In part, potential litigants fear that such suits will result in bad publicity because "it is 
169. See Richard C. Levin et al.,Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECON. 783, 807 (1987). 
170. 35 u.s.c. § 286 (2000). 
171. Walsh et al., Working, supra note 138, at 1021; see also DavidJ.F. Gross & Lee Pulju, Ten Things 
lo Consider Before Sending a Patent Infringement Warning Letter, 15 J. PROPRJET ARY RTS. 12, 13 (2003 ). 
172. See Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 120, at 315. 
173. See id. 
174. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 194, 205-07 (1998) (finding that forty-six percent of patents were invalidated in cases 
litigated between 1989 to 1996). 
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not good form to sue researchers in academic institutions and stifle their progress." 175 
Industry also has much to gain by developing trusting relationships with university 
researchers. 176 
Some scientists even admitted that they welcome a low level of patent 
infringement because such "background infringement" can contribute to the value of 
their invention by generating interest in the new technology. 177 This is because of the 
belief that those who utilize a particular new technology to solve a research problem 
are likely to continue to use that technology-and share it with others-in the future. 
Thus, when the "background infringement" becomes too great, the patent-holders 
assert their property rights against the infringers by offering a license to use the 
invention. The infringing scientists are then forced either to obtain a license for the 
technologies they have used in their research methods or search for new methods to 
solve the problems. 178 
4. Sovereign Immunity for State Universities 
A narrow experimental use exception poses an even lower threat of impending 
doom to academic researchers given the immunity conferred on a significant number 
of universities because of their status as public institutions. 179 Trying to avoid this 
result, Congress (using its Article I powers) passed legislation in 1992 that expressly 
abolished sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for states and state 
employees who engage in patent infringement. 180 In 1999, however, the Supreme Court 
held the law unconstitutional in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense 
Board v. College Savings Bank. 181 The Court reasoned that state sovereign immunity 
can be abrogated only under the Fourteenth Amendment, not under Congress's Article 
I powers. 182 Since Congress did not provide a basis under the Fourteenth Amendment 
for abolishing state immunity from patent infringement liability, the law was 
unconstitutional. 183 Accordingly, state entities, including state universities, are immune 
from patent infringement suits. 
175. Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 120, at 325. 
176. In the Walsh survey, one respondent from a private firm noted: 
We rely on lots of outside collaborations with academic labs. Our scientists want to feel on 
good terms with the academic community. If you start suing, it breaks down the good 
feeling. We give out our research tools for free, frequently. All we ask is, if you invent 
anything that is directly related to the tool, you allow us the freedom to practice. 
Id. at 326. 
177. See id. 
178. See Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463,463 (1995). 
179. Approximately forty percent of degree granting postsecondary institutions are public. See THOMAS 
D. SYNDER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2003, at 310 tbl.246 (2004), 
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005025.pdf( degree-granting institutions, by control and type of 
institution: 1949-1950 to 2002-2003). 
180. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, § 2(a)(2), 106 
Stat. 4230, 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 296 (2000)). 
181. 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999). 
182. Id. at 637. 
I 83. Id. at 639-43. 
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This ruling is particularly significant here because public universities sit front and 
center in patenting activity. Approximately sixty percent of the patents issued to 
universities in 2001 went to public universities. 184 Thus, their immunity from 
infringement damages is very significant. For all practical purposes, these universities 
essentially have wide latitude to infringe, and patent-holders have little recourse. 185 An 
experimental use exception-narrow or broad-has less impact on state universities 
as defendants because, unlike their private counterparts, they are insulated. 186 They are 
in the rare and enviable position of having the best of both worlds: they can sue others 
for patent infringement but cannot be sued for the same practice. 
Allowing state universities sovereign immunity from patent infringement may have 
the unforeseen consequence of indirectly granting immunity to private industry 
collaborators who shift resources to the university for just such protection. 187 It is 
currently unknown what level of state funding or control will make a collaborative 
endeavor an instrumentality of the state (and thus protected under state immunity), 
rather than a disguised extension of the private industry collaborator. 188 
V. THE EXEMPTION Is APPROPRIATELY NARROW 
This Article does not support a judicial broadening of the experimental use 
exception. In order for the exception to remain limited and thereby make meaningful 
a patent-holder's rights to exclusivity, the exception must be kept narrow. To do 
otherwise would risk enlarging the exception to a point where it swallows the rule 
prohibiting patent infringement. Even recognizing that, as with most rules, there may 
be a sufficiently compelling reason to create an exception to the exception, there has 
been no evidence presented indicating why research universities deserve special 
treatment in this area. To the extent that the business of a university, as it pertains to 
research, has become indistinguishable from the business of a commercial research lab, 
it seems only fair that the rules should apply equally to both. 
Infringement is not a matter of degree. Courts have made clear that there is no 
such thing as de minimis infringement. 189 Thus, any exceptions to infringement should 
be similarly specific and not open to a question of degree or to an evaluation of merit. 
In particular, where a university has infringed a patent through its research activities, 
184. National Science Board 2004, supra note 115, at A5-105. The top ten patenting public universities 
from 1991 to 200 I were University of California, University of Texas, University of Wisconsin, University 
of Florida, State University of New York, University of Michigan, Iowa State University, University of 
Minnesota, Michigan State University, and University of Washington. Id. 
185. However, under the Ex parte Young doctrine, state workers may be sued in federal court in their 
individual capacity. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908); see also Peter S. Menell, Symposium 
on New Direction in Federalism: Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from Infringement 
of Federallntellectual Property Rights, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1404 (2000). Further, although patent-
holders cannot obtain monetary compensation from the state, they may obtain injunctive relief. See id. 
However, injunctive reliefagainst a state university under Eleventh Amendment state immunity would still 
make litigation expensive and time-consuming. Id. 
186. For further discussion about state universities' immunity from intellectual property claims, see Traci 
Dreher Quigley, Comment, Commercialization of the State University: Why the Intellectual Property 
Protection Restoration Act of2003 Is Necessary, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2004). 
187. Mueller, supra note 3, at 33-34. 
188. See id. at 36. 
189. See, e.g., Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858,861 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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it should not be up to the courts to decide and assess the nature of the infringement, the 
intent of the researcher, or whether the infringement led to the discovery of a 
commercially viable product. 190 
Moreover, a broad experimental use exception would provide disincentives to 
invest in patenting and innovation. Weakening a patentee's control over her patented 
invention deprives her of the pecuniary benefits associated with the patent, thus 
reducing the returns from her investment in the invention. Further, a broad exception 
would also discourage investors from devoting capital resources to research and 
development projects that could have yielded future returns from a patent. 191 
A. Patenting Promotes Innovation and the Public Good 
Innovation is important not only for commercial profits but also because it 
advances the public good. The patent system encourages innovation by rewarding the 
substantial investments necessary for research and development. It promotes invention 
by granting the inventor an exclusive right to exclude others from her invention and 
giving her the ability to profit from it. Patenting also leads to greater efficiency by 
encouraging the invention of new and better products. 192 
In addition, the patent system promotes the development and commercialization 
of inventions. There are several stages between the initial invention of a product and 
the commercial development of the product to a point where it is ready for market. 
Getting from one point to the other is costly and risky. 193 By preventing others from 
using the invention for a certain period of time, the patent system permits the inventor 
to recoup the costs of developing the product. But for these exclusive rights, free-riders 
may take advantage of other's inventions, without having expended the resources for 
development. 194 Free-riding can hurt the inventor's ability to realize a return on her 
investment. 195 
The disclosure required by the patent system 196 is a further benefit to society. It 
requires inventors to make information publicly available that ordinarily would remain 
undisclosed as a trade secret. This benefits both the public and the inventor. It benefits 
the public by helping to avoid needless duplication of efforts. 197 For instance, a 
competitor may learn the results of a certain experiment and be more accurately 
informed about whether to pursue the project. Competitors also learn through patent 
disclosures what technology is available for licensing and cross-licensing, leading to 
a more efficient option than developing the technology itself. 198 
190. Any such analysis should be legislatively defined, as in the Hatch-Waxman Act. See infra Part V.D. 
191. See Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad 
Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169, 2181 (1991). 
192. WARDS. BOWMAN JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 2-3 (1973). 
193. Michel, supra note 110, at 392. 
194. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 
(1977). 
195. See Ben T. Yu, Potential Competition and Contracting in Innovation, 24 J.L. & ECON. 215, 237 
(1981). 
196. 35 u.s.c. § 112 (2000). 
197. See Michel, supra note 110, at 392-93. 
198. See id. at 395-96. 
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As to the inventor, were she to keep the information as a trade secret rather than 
obtain a patent, she takes on greater risks. There is the risk, for example, of having the 
information disclosed and losing the trade secret protection, as well as the risk that 
someone else will independently develop the invention (in which case the inventor 
would be without recourse ). 199 Weakening patent protection would lead more 
inventors to choose trade secret protection, the secrecy of which does not promote 
innovation. 200 
B. The Case for Expansion Is Not Persuasive 
For those who advocate expansion of the experimental use exception, the 
underlying reason appears to be the belief that such expansion will promote progress 
and innovation. Other than the theoretical supposition that a narrow experimental use 
exception will lead to less innovation, there has been no demonstrable evidence that 
such is the case in practice. Even major research universities concede that "the more 
one limits the patent rights conferred by Congress, the less one promotes the progress 
of science." 201 Similarly, the Patent and Trademark Office opposed legislation 
broadening the experimental use exception because it would diminish the "strong 
incentive provided by the patent system." 202 
The status quo (a narrow experimental use exception) appears to have had a 
positive effect on research and innovation. Our patent laws are based on the notion of 
exclusivity and derive from the Constitution, which authorizes Congress "to promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 203 The 
premise that a person will be motivated to innovate because the patent laws will reward 
him for having expended the time and resources underlies our system. One need look 
no further than the biomedical activity over the last two decades, for instance, to see 
the impact that patents have had on innovation and commercialization. 204 Patents have 
also proven critical to the large increase in biotechnology start-up companies over the 
last few years, and it seems logical that they will continue to spur growth and 
innovation in many areas.205 
The process of obtaining a patent is expensive and time consuming. 206 In order to 
be worthwhile, the right to exclude others (and the attendant royalties and other 
financial benefits) must be meaningful-it cannot be so filled with holes and 
exceptions that the benefit to the patent-holder is outweighed by the benefits to the 
general public. At a minimum, allowing unlicensed use of a patent deprives the patent-
199. See id. at 391-92. 
200. See id. at 396. 
20 I. Wisconsin Amicus Brief, supra note I 00, at 11. 
202. H.R. REP. No. 101-960, at 8 n.25 (1990). 
203. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. 
204. Walsh et al., Effects, supra note 120, at 285. 
205. Id. at 286--87. 
206. See Vance Franklin Brown, Comment, The Incompatibility a/Copyright and Computer Software: 
An Economic Evaluation and a Proposal/or a Marketplace Solution, 66 N.C. L. REV. 977,981 (1988) 
(stating that obtaining a patent is an expensive process that can often take up to five years); see also 
Raymond E. Vickery, Jr., The Laws and Outer Space: Intellectual Property, 4 J.L. & TECH. 9, IO (I 989) 
(noting that obtaining a patent can take a number of years and cost thousands of dollars). 
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holder ofroyalties. The patentee is contributing something of value to research, even 
if that contribution consists of negative information, such as findings indicating that 
something does not work. 207 
If the desire to expand the experimental use exception stems from general 
dissatisfaction with the patent laws as they exist today, engaging the courts in that 
battle is a misguided approach. If the system is in need of an overhaul, then reformers 
should seek to overhaul the system (which seems best done legislatively) rather than 
eviscerate the exemption. Strong patent enforcement is good for consumers because 
it provides a valuable incentive for innovation. 208 As discussed below, Congress 
should only step in to chip away the rights of patent-holders when it determines that 
a compelling need has been established in a particular area. 
C. The Scope of Proposals for Expansion Is Hard to Define 
Among those who favor expansion, there does not appear to be a clear consensus 
on the precise parameters of the infringement exemption. They seem to have a difficult 
time defining precisely where to draw the line in the delicate balance between 
protecting the patent-holder's rights and fostering research and innovation. 209 Should 
the rule be that all research universities are exempt, that only research tools are exempt, 
or that a particular type of research is exempt? 
Some have proposed the rule that no patent infringement occurs as long as the 
experimenter is an academic or other non-profit research institution. 210 However, if the 
researcher develops a commercially patented invention, then the researcher should pay 
royalties to the patent-holder for any patents used in the design. 211 These proposals fail 
to clearly define or identify the point at which a commercialized product has been 
created for the purpose of requiring the royalty payments. Would it occur at the 
marketing stage, the product testing stage, the order solicitation stage, or some later 
stage? 
Given the ties between universities and industry discussed above, this expansion 
may pose another problem by allowing corporations to circumvent the experimental 
use exception due to their affiliation with a university on a particular project. In other 
words, had the identical research been conducted in the corporation's laboratory, it 
would have fallen outside of the experimental use exception. However, conducting the 
same corporate-sponsored research in the university's laboratory provides a protective 
cloak. 
The proposals for expansion also appear to exempt from infringement a researcher 
who uses a patented device for its intended purpose as a tool for conducting 
research. 212 To allow this kind of infringement simply because the tool was used in a 
university's research lab (the patentee's market) completely circumvents and 
207. See Michel, supra note 110, at 395. 
208. John Shepard Wiley Jr. et al., The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. REV. 693, 715 n.84 (1990). 
209. See, e.g., Eyal H. Barash, Comment, Experimental Uses, Patents, and Scientific Progress, 91 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 667, 699-700 (1997); Caruso, supra note 5, at 220; Derzko, supra note 5, at 366---367; 
Strandburg, supra note 5, at 138-146; Sandstrom, supra note 5, at I 106--08. 
210. See, e.g., Barash, supra note 209, at 667, 699-700; Sandstrom, supra note 5, at I 106--08. 
211./d. 
212. See infra note 214. 
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eviscerates one's patent rights. Even universities themselves who hold a large number 
of these patented research tools would have to concede that, at the very least, such a 
program would not be desirable because it would cause them to lose royalty payments. 
Others have proposed or debated a compulsory licensing scheme, which includes 
some variation of government mandated permission to use a patented device without 
consent and the payment of royalties to the patent owner.213 
Finally, there has been much debate about biomedical research tools and precisely 
how a special exemption should protect them. 214 It seems, however, that the notion of 
allowing free research (i.e., without the alleged burdens of obtaining permission) and 
later payment ofroyalties only if the research has led to a commercialized product is 
already the de facto rule. It is highly unlikely that a patent-holder will discover 
infringement or even sue an early stage researcher because, among other reasons, the 
damages would prove too small to justify the cost of the litigation.215 Rather, serious 
negotiations between the researcher and the patentee occur toward the later stages of 
the product development process, because at that point they both have greater reasons 
and incentives to strike a deal. To the extent that university labs continue to resemble 
their commercial counterparts, justifying special treatment for universities will become 
even more difficult. 
There is one further view that deserves discussion: the suggestion that, like 
copyright law, there should be a fair use exemption to patent law.216 The doctrine of 
fair use, part of the 1976 Copyright Act, permits others to use the copyrighted material 
in a reasonable manner without consent. 217 Thus, the argument would go, where use 
occurs in the context of education, research, or other socially valuable activities, a fair 
use exception to patent infringement (i.e., a broader experimental use exception) makes 
sense. Even without undertaking an exhaustive review and analysis of the fair use 
doctrine, however, it does not seem to be the kind of model that patent law should 
emulate. 
The fair use doctrine has been quite troublesome in copyright law and has 
engendered extensive litigation ( about ten times more cases than the experimental use 
213. See, e.g., Cole M. Fauver, Comment, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Come, 8 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 666 (1988); Alan M. Fisch, Comment, Compulsory 
Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: An Unreasonable Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 
JURIMETRICS J. 295 (1994); Paul Gormley, Comment, Compulsory Patent Licenses and Environmental 
Protection, 7 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 131 (1993); Strandburg, supra note 5, at 138-46. 
214. The research tool discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. However, for additional reference, 
see, e.g., Derzko, supra note 5, at 347; Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1084-86; Mueller, supra note 3, at 1; 
Strandburg, supra note 5, at 81. 
215. SeesupraPartIV.C.1-2. 
216. See, e.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1177 (2000). 
217. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000)). 
The preamble to section 107 reads: 
Id. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section I 06, the fairuse ofa copyrighted work, including 
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that 
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright. 
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exception). 218 Part of the reason for this problem is the ad hoc nature of the doctrine, 
lacking precise definitions in order to remain flexible to adapt to new technologies on 
a case-by-case basis. 219 It relies on the application of four broad and vague factors to 
determine whether use is fair.220 However, the application of these factors has led to 
inconsistent and unpredictable results. In any given case, for instance, the majority and 
dissenting opinions may disagree on each factor.221 It is to be expected that an 
experimental use exception that resembles the fair use doctrine will cause a tremendous 
increase in litigation as parties and courts struggle to decide which activities are 
covered by the exemption in any given case. Accordingly, for this reason alone, the fair 
use doctrine does not present an efficient model. 
It is also interesting to mention that when it comes to copying for educational use, 
fair use cases mirror two of the experimental use trends presented in this Article. First, 
when course packets are used for educational purposes, the commercial copy center 
making the copies for profit is not allowed the fair use defense. 222 This seems to 
suggest the importance of profit or commercial motive as in the experimental use 
exception cases. Second, publishers enforcing their copyrights are choosing to sue the 
commercial copy centers who make the copies rather than the universities who are the 
direct infringers. 223 Again, this pattern mirrors the de facto practice under the 
experimental use exception. 
D. Congress Should Expand the Exemption Only for Compelling Reasons 
Any expansion of the experimental use exception should occur legislatively and 
only where necessary. 224 Such legislative pronouncements, in conjunction with 
subsequent judicial interpretation of legislative intent, offer the best method for 
addressing any compelling public policy reasons for expansion of the doctrine. To 
218. A search revealed that since the enactment of the doctrine on October 19, 1976, the courts have 
decided 823 cases involving fair use claims (search parameters in LEXIS Federal & State Cases, Combined 
database for "fair use and copyright" after I 0/19/76; conducted on 8/2/05). By comparison, during the 
same time period, only 85 experimental use exception cases were decided (search parameters in LEXIS 
Federal & State Cases, Combined database for "experimental use exception and not (statutory exemption 
or prior use defense) and patent infringement" after I 0/19/76; conducted on 8/2/05). 
219. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) ("courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular 
situations on a case-by-case basis .... "); see also Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. 
Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. I 980) ("The doctrine of fair use ... permits courts to avoid rigid application 
of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to 
foster."). 
220. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
221. For example, compare Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), with Justice Brennan's dissent. 
222. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996); Basic 
Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
223. See id. In Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko 's Graphics Corp., Kinko's paid the publishers $1,875,000 
and was barred from supplying course packets for ten years. Judith Rosen, Kinko 's Re-enters Coursepack 
Market, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Sept. 22, 2003, available at http://www.publishersweekly.com/article/ 
CA324 l 09 .html? pubdate=9%2F22%2F2003&display=archive. 
224. See lnfigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967,981 (W.D. Wis. 1999) ("[I]t is 
up to Congress to decide whether there should be an infringement exemption for university-based research 
laboratories."). 
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date, Congress has not seen fit, and has indeed refused, to broaden the scope of the 
experimental use exception to protect universities. 225 As this Article suggests, such 
congressional refusal may be because the existence and definition of a true problem has 
not been established. 226 
1. Exemptions to Date 
Rather, Congress has acted in specific instances to grant particular exemptions, 
such as that granted to the pharmaceutical industry in the Hatch-Waxman Act. 227 This 
process allows Congress to determine whether an endeavor is sufficiently compelling 
and necessary for the public welfare that it trumps a patent-holder's rights. 228 The 
provision for generic drugs, 229 medical devices, 230 and drug development in general ( as 
now interpreted by the Supreme Court) has met such criteria. In addition, Congress has 
also enacted an exemption for infringement of patented medical or surgical proce-
dures. 231 Institutional status-the mere fact that an enterprise is a research university 
-has not and probably should not fit the bill. 
2. A Proposed Standard 
Unfortunately, no clear indication of the objective reasons for these exemptions 
appears to exist; there is no test that would guide the result on the next proposed 
exemption. Even recognizing that congressional acts are part of a political process, not 
guided by specific articulable criteria, Congress could benefit, nonetheless, from 
standards by which to craft legislation on this issue. Further, Congress may also choose 
to articulate standards that would allow courts to deal with experimental use exception 
cases. 
With that in mind, this Article recommends a test that generally balances the 
individual patent-holder's rights to exclusivity against society's interests in using her 
invention. More specifically, in deciding whether to permit infringement and bypass 
225. See, e.g., Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990, H.R. 5598, 101st 
Cong. (1990) (unsuccessful bill proposing exemptions from infringement for university research). 
226. One legislator noted, ''The stated purpose of [the proposed legislation] is to protect university 
research activity. I fail to understand what universities are being protected from. There has never been a 
case, to my knowledge, where a university has been sued for patent infringement for carrying on research 
on a patented invention." H.R. REP. NO. l 0 1-960(1) ( 1990). 
227. See 35 U.S.C. § 27l(e)(l) (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 906 (2000); 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2000). 
228. Congress may also require compulsory licensing in certain areas. See, e.g., Charles Pfizer & Co. 
v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 401 F.2d 574,577 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (I 969) (holding that 
the FTC has authority to require compulsory licensing of tetracycline and aueromycin patents on a 
reasonable royalty basis). In addition, the Clean Air Act provides for compulsory licensing of patents on 
pollution control devices to those who cannot use substitutes to meet the statutory pollution guidelines. 42 
U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2000). 
229. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 
1603 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 27I(e)). 
230. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661,664 (1990). 
231. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000). 
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the patentee's rights, Congress should find that the patent-holder's refusal to license 232 
the invention will have an injurious effect on the public welfare and on innovation. 
To illustrate the test, it may be helpful to revisit the hypothetical posed at the 
beginning of this Article with Ivan and his Gizmo. Assume that the researchers at the 
local university believe that Ivan's Gizmo will be useful in finding a cure for cancer. 
They seek a license from him, but he refuses. In fact, he refuses to license it to 
anyone. 233 Ivan does not have the knowledge or the resources to use his device the way 
the university researchers would. The matter is before Congress. 234 
First, Congress should examine whether Ivan's refusal to license could have a 
potentially injurious effect on the public welfare. Given the importance of finding a 
cure for cancer, a compelling case for an affirmative response can be made here. 
Second, Congress should ask if a compelling case can be made that the refusal could 
have an injurious effect on innovation. Ivan, without the knowledge or resources, 
cannot use his device to find a cure for cancer (he may not even suspect that it has any 
connection to cancer). He hinders innovation (i) by not having the ability to research 
and develop a potentially momentous technology and (ii) by refusing to permit anyone 
else to invent the technology. Accordingly, this situation would justify Congress 
curtailing Ivan's rights, 235 and either forcing him to license the technology2 36 or 
declaring that use of the device for research is not an act of infringement where it has 
been shown that such use would constitute a necessary step of a protocol for finding 
a cure for cancer. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Madey court's narrow interpretation of the experimental use exception is 
consistent with precedent, consistent with public policy, and appropriate for university 
232. Requiring that the prospective infringer seek a license first is in keeping with respect for patent 
rights. It seems fair that the patent-holder have something akin to a right of first refusal on the patented 
invention before having Congress decide to curtail or abrogate those rights. This arrangement also permits 
the marketplace to govern the transaction. See supra Part IV.B. 
233. In reality, Ivan's refusal to license would be highly unusual. He would have so much to gain from 
participation in finding a cure for cancer through royalties, licensing fees, and possible ownership interests 
in the cure, that it would make very little sense to refuse. See supra Parts IV.B-C. Assuming, however, that 
he either refuses to license or seeks draconian terms and that there is no other alternative to using his 
invention, then it is fair for the public, through Congress, to step in. 
234. Admittedly, Congress (unlike the courts) generally does not deal with an individual situation. 
However, for purposes of the hypothetical, "Ivan" could represent a corporation or industry practice that 
has created or is creating the kind of obstacle that would justify congressional intervention. 
235. This could be seen as a consistent legislative corollary to the policy supporting the defense of patent 
misuse. Although a patentee's refusal to license does not constitute misuse of the patent, to the extent the 
behavior has anticompetitive effects on the market, the patent may be held unenforceable. See generally 
ROGER E. SCHECHTER &JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PA TENTS 
AND TRADEMARKS § 21.3, at 505-08 (2003). 
236. This is, in effect, a kind of compulsory licensing. However, unlike other proposed compulsory 
licensing schemes, this approach is more specific and limited in terms ofits scope. For instance, it does not 
apply to all research tools. Cf supra note 213. Moreover, it requires, as a threshold matter, consideration 
of the effect on the public welfare and on innovation in the particular circumstances. It also grants the 
patent-holder an opportunity to negotiate freely with the prospective licensee before facing the blanket 
imposition of a compulsory license. 
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research. Given the nature ofuniversity research today and its resemblance to industry 
research, it does not seem fair that universities should receive special treatment from 
infringement simply by virtue of their being universities. In order to make a patent-
holder's right to exclude others meaningful, any attempt to broaden the activities that 
are exempt from infringement under the doctrine must be done sparingly and only for 
compelling reasons. Congress should consider expanding the exemption only in 
situations where a compelling case has been made that a patent-holder's refusal to 
license threatens the public welfare and innovation. 
In practice, Madey will probably have very little effect on the way research is 
conducted at universities. Even if researchers may technically be engaging in patent 
infringement in their labs (as had become commonplace before Madey), they are not 
likely to suffer repercussions. There are various norms and considerations that greatly 
favor and protect academic research in a way that will ensure its survival. 
Finally, recent gaps have been created in the experimental use exception as a result . 
of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act and because of state 
universities' immunity from patent infringement. Far from leaving the doctrine as an 
empty shell, however, these gaps weigh in favor of saving and safeguarding the 
doctrine. The doctrine is still of consequence, for instance, to private universities, 
individual researchers at state universities, industrial researchers, and the world of non-
drug development researchers. Because each chip off the doctrine signals a further 
erosion of patent-holders' rights and an accompanying harm to the incentives to invent 
and innovate, careful consideration of the doctrine is still required. 
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